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COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE  
USE OF DRUGS AND BANNED PRACTICES  
INTENDED TO INCREASE ATHLETIC PERFORMANCE

B E F O R E:

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE CHARLES LEONARD DUBIN

HEARING HELD AT 1235 BAY STREET,  
2nd FLOOR, TORONTO, ONTARIO,  
ON FRIDAY, AUGUST 25, 1989

VOLUME 78


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C O U N S E L:

R. ARMSTRONG, Q.C.	on behalf of the Commission
R. BOURQUE	on behalf of the Canadian Track and Field Association
J. DePENCIER	on behalf of the Government of Canada
R. McCREATH	on behalf of the Canadian Olympic Association
A. PRATT	on behalf of Charles Francis
J. FREEDMAN	on behalf of Mr. Wilf Wedmann



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--- Upon commencing.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Armstrong. Mr. Wedmann.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

WILFRED WEDMANN: Recalled.

--- EXAMINATION BY MR. ARMSTRONG: (Cont'd)

Q. Mr. Wedmann, I note from your

10 Curriculum Vitae that you joined the staff of the Canadian Track and Field Association in July of 1985, and, therefore, you would, I presume, not have been around the office at the time that the training camp was held in Provo, Utah in May of 1985?

15 A. That is correct.

Q. Now, did you, however, become aware of this report that was filed by Tom MacWilliam, a Report of the Doping Control Education Coordinator, Sprint Training Camp, Provo, Utah, 22nd of May, 1985. Did that cross your desk after you joined the organization?

20 A. It doesn't ring a bell off the top of my mind.

Q. Apart from the report, did you become aware that there had been a plan at that training camp to show an audio visual presentation on doping control at the

25



training camp but because of, as Mr. MacWilliam described it, outright hostility, the audio visual presentation was dropped?

A. No.

5 Q. All right. Further, did you become aware that, from Mr. MacWilliam, that at the training camp he had planned to carry out what he described as out-of-competition testing, but that the sprint coaches at the camp: Gerard Mach, Brian McKinnon, Charlie Francis, 10 and Alex Gardiner all took the position that testing had to be carried out in conjunction with a meet. And so MacWilliam was able to carry out the testing under the, almost the guise, that there was a meet because there was a mini-meet scheduled for the training camp that next 15 afternoon --

A. I am not aware of the particulars.

Q. -- or during the course of the camp, rather?

A. No, I am not aware of the particulars 20 at that time.

Q. Were you aware that in fact an issue did arise, however, shortly before you arrived on staff concerning clearly what appears to have been some opposition to the implementation of out-of-competition 25 testing at that time?



A. I became aware I think from Terry McKinty in his exchange with Gerard Mach. I have a memory of Terry asserting very strongly that he was in charge of the program and that they were not to interfere with him, and I certainly sustained that.

Q. All right. During the course of your tenure, first as general manager, then as president between '85 and '88, did you from time to time experience opposition from your constituents as it were, the athletes and the coaches, to the implementation of out-of-competition testing?

A. Well, during the whole policy sessions following September '86, we did certainly receive some opposition from the Athletes' Council, but I saw that as part of the education process that we would go through, and took it in that vein.

Q. Did you ever develop any sense or awareness that perhaps there was opposition to the implementation of out-of-competition testing on the basis that some of the athletes in fact were on steroid programs, and, therefore, did not want to be at risk?

A. That is not the basis on which I understood their opposition to be.

Q. All right. Again, was your suspicion level ever raised that that might be behind their unspoken



opposition?

5           A.    No, I was I guess in reviewing  
sometimes with Mr. Findlay the Athlete Council's progress,  
there seemed to be some contradictions that I couldn't  
understand. For example, on the one hand, the Athletes'  
Council seemed to be indicating that they were clearly  
opposed to the use of banned substances. On the other  
hand, they would state we shouldn't be doing anything more  
than internationally -- what was done internationally, and  
10   that seemed to be a contradiction from my vantage point  
that if you're opposed, then why should we have an  
opposition to it.

          On the other hand, I can also understand why  
some of the athletes and other individuals may, in fact,  
15   be concerned about testing out of competition with people  
appearing at your door step, et cetera.

          So, I can understand some of the concerns,  
but I did not base it on a kind of view point that if you  
are opposed to it, therefore you must have something to  
20   hide. That was not the perspective I had on the matter.

          Q.    Then Mr. Wedmann, I want to take you to  
some evidence that Mr. Glenn Bogue gave. He was, I  
believe, the predecessor to Mr. Findlay as your Athlete  
Services Representative or Coordinator?

25           A.    Yes.



Q. He testified that in 1985, he suggested it was about two months in to your mandate as general manager that he approached you with information from an athlete, as he described it, of significant standing in Toronto concerning steroid use including steroid use by Ben Johnson.

He said that he had gotten this information from Desai Williams, although he does not think that he disclosed Desai Williams' name to you. And that he was concerned that something be done about the information that he had received about steroid use in Toronto, including Ben Johnson, and that he proceeded to have a lengthy three-hour discussion with you. Do you have a recollection of that discussion?

A. I have a recollection of the discussion, yes.

Q. Yes. What is your recollection?

A. I think the first point I would make is that I have no recollection that this took place in 1985. My view would be that it took place in the summer of 1986.

Q. Yes.

A. That's based partially on the fact that I was not chief executive officer until after April.

THE COMMISSIONER: When did Bogue leave?

THE WITNESS: October 1986. Mr. Bogue, I



believe, in reading the testimony, sir, made extensive allusion to my chief executive powers and the illustrious authority I had. The change in the corporate restructuring did not take place until April 1986.

5 THE COMMISSIONER: In any event, he has given evidence as to his discussions with you.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

10 THE COMMISSIONER: It's the plan that he wanted to implement to prove what his informant was telling him.

15 THE WITNESS: Yes. My point I guess is that the context is rather important because we were at the same time working on developing the out-of-competition testing program. So, it is within the context of that that I believe this discussion took place.

THE COMMISSIONER: Go ahead, Mr. Armstrong.

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. All right. And --

20 THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Bogue was quite specific as to what he told you and he was seeking authority to carry out a plan of attack, if you like, which would disclose what was going on.

25 THE WITNESS: Yes. Would you like me to give my interruption?



MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. Yes, please.

A. As I say, I believe it took place in the summer of 1986. I was in his office, and Mr. Bogue --  
5 we were in the midst of another conversation at which time Mr. Bogue made some statement to the effect that Mr. Francis is pushing substances on young people. Whereupon, I believe, I replied "How do you know that?" "I have some people at the York center." And I said -- then he said  
10 "They are prepared to speak off the record." I said "Well, that doesn't do us any good. We need people on the record. We need people that we can put before our hearing to testify to that effect." He said, "Well, these individuals, they will tell us when the next shipment  
15 arrives, and we can then appear at the Center and get Ben to give us a sample. I said "On what authority will we demand the sample?"

THE COMMISSIONER: No, but he said you would be there when the shipment arrived.

20 THE WITNESS: Well --

THE COMMISSIONER: So, you would -- you wouldn't need a sample, you would see what was going on.

THE WITNESS: Well, that was not my understanding. In my conversation he said we would be  
25 told when the next shipment arrived, and we would then be



demanding a sample from Mr. Johnson, was his plan.

And I asked him on what authority and, basically, I did not believe we had the authority to simply appear and ask Mr. Johnson to give us a sample.

5 And as a result, that was basically the end of the conversation. It was -- my recollection that of it is was not that it was a major, lengthy, three-hour conversation, it was --

10 THE COMMISSIONER: Well, by this time had he not agreed in his contract that he would submit himself to random testing?

THE WITNESS: I think he had agreed --

THE COMMISSIONER: I thought at that time it was already in the contract.

15 THE WITNESS: Well, he knew --

THE COMMISSIONER: You put it in when, in 1986 now?

20 THE WITNESS: We put it in '86 and it was at that time also that we were working on expanding the program to be random in the full sense of the word.

THE COMMISSIONER: At one stage the athletes were required to sign in their contract as a condition of their participation these -- you have seen the contract, have you not?

25 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have signed a number of



them, yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Weren't they in effect  
in 1986?

5 THE WITNESS: My understanding in talking  
with Glenn was that we were putting in a clause to the  
effect that we would have the out-of-competition testing  
clause in place. I can't recall off the top of my mind  
whether in fact there was such a clause, a general clause  
in, right from the beginning.

10 THE COMMISSIONER: Well, it would be pretty  
important to know that if you said you had no authority to  
do it.

15 THE WITNESS: Well, I guess I was working  
from the fundamental vantage point that we had this policy  
on banned substances that was in existence, at that time  
it was based on the February '86 policy, that said that we  
would be able to test at competitions and training  
sessions in accordance with the annual plan developed and  
submitted to Sport Canada.

20 THE COMMISSIONER: I interrupted you, go  
head, Mr. Armstrong, I am sorry.

MR. ARMSTRONG:

25 Q. Now, did Mr. Bogue tell you who the  
source was --



A. No, he did not.

Q. -- of the information?

A. He said he had a couple of people in the York Center.

5 Q. In the York Center?

A. Yes.

Q. This was the High Performance Center at York over which the CTFA had some responsibility through sponsorship and through the head coach, Charlie Francis?

10 A. Yes.

Q. By virtue of that, did it not occur to you that, well, maybe we should just call Charlie Francis in, our employee, and tell him the information that we have or at least question him about this information that we have.

15

Was there any thought along those lines to kind of get to the bottom of this story in other --

THE COMMISSIONER: May I presume before -- why didn't you go ahead with the idea that Bogue had that he's got somebody inside. These are what we call "informants" in the general parochial who often don't disclose their names, that doesn't mean that their information is not valid, sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't. I don't understand why you wouldn't have said, well -- Mr. Bogue said he wanted you to give him

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25



authority to sort of pursue this plan that he was working out with this informant and you wouldn't give them that authority.

THE WITNESS: Well --

5 THE COMMISSIONER: He wanted to go and have somebody there to observe what was going on --

THE WITNESS: Well, the context I explained --

10 THE COMMISSIONER: -- of the so-called shipment. I don't know what it meant --

THE WITNESS: Right.

15 THE COMMISSIONER: -- but it meant they were going to have somebody there when something was being at the York Centre which would be apparent to the person looking at it.

THE WITNESS: Well, my explanation --

THE COMMISSIONER: An investigator of some sort.

20 THE WITNESS: The conversation as I outlined to you illustrated I asked him on what authority, and he didn't have an answer for that either. And basically that was virtually the end of the meeting.

25 Now, I had a few views about Mr. Bogue's judgment, his ability to judge. And I had to make a judgment call on the basis of the information he had.



One, was the context. In the middle of a conversation he brings up this subject matter. Secondly, I do know that Mr. Bogue has been an ardent critic of our sprint program, of our national program, of Mr. Francis. In fact, they had had their run-ins from time to time that on one occasion the executive of the Canadian Track and Field Association had to intervene in.

I looked at that and did not feel that Mr. Bogue had given me anything that was very substantial.



THE COMMISSIONER: By this, Mr. Wedmann, if you put it in '86, it obviously had come to your attention that there were at least rumors about the Mazda Sprint Club? You knew something about that by this time?

5 THE WITNESS: Not very much at that time.

THE COMMISSIONER: Not very much. I see. And you knew by your contemporary reading of the extended use of anabolic steroids in international competition?

THE WITNESS: To some degree, yes.

10 THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Mr. Bogue came to you with a plan which may or may not have worked, but a real opportunity for you to check out whether rumors were substance or not?

15 THE WITNESS: Well, sir, on the other hand --

THE COMMISSIONER: And that's a pretty good start if you've got somebody inside an organization whose's prepared to be an informant. The fact that he doesn't want his name public is not unusual.

20 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't think at this point I was asking for a public name. Mr. Bogue -- in fact, my recollection is not that I required the individual to come --

25 THE COMMISSIONER: What was lacking? Why didn't you say, "Let's sit down and talk about this; let's



go into it in more detail and see what we can do about it"?

I know there's a danger of looking at this with the benefit of hindsight, but I'm trying to avoid that. I'm just trying to put myself in your position.

THE WITNESS: Well from my position, I'm in the midst of a conversation with this individual, and in the process of that, he brings up a statement to the effect that Charlie or Mr. Francis is pushing youngsters at the Center to use steroids.

THE COMMISSIONER: That's a pretty important comment.

THE WITNESS: Yes. And so I asked him, "On what basis?" And he said, "I've got my informants, and they are willing to talk off the record," at which point I said, "Well, we need this on the record. We need something that we can put before..." --

THE COMMISSIONER: He told you that his informants were prepared to sort of set a trap, if you like?

THE WITNESS: That was the subsequent -- after I had talked about off the record, he said, "Yes, we'll set a trap."

THE COMMISSIONER: For whatever motives his informants may or may not have had, they were going to set



a trap, and he wanted authority to pursue this?

THE WITNESS: Well, he said -- they were prepared to tell me when the next shipment comes and then we'll just appear and we'll demand a sample. I did not  
5 believe we had the authority to demand a sample.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, why didn't you go and see if a shipment did arrive? You know, the agreement was that none of these athletes had the right to be in possession of steroids.

10 THE WITNESS: That's true.

THE COMMISSIONER: That's in your contract.

THE WITNESS: From my vantage point, I did not put much weight in what Mr. Bogue was saying at that point in time on the basis of my experience with Mr. Bogue  
15 and Mr. Bogue's previous, as I say, opposition and criticism constantly; and I think a very telling factor here was the fact that I think as I went out, I said something to the effect of "We need something we can put before a hearing panel," and I did not say cease and  
20 desist. There was none of that kind of thing in this conversation whatsoever.

Mr. Bogue, on the other hand, is a kind of individual that is a very persistent individual, and he and I have had numerous discussions that have extended  
25 over a significant period of time. Part of that was



because we wanted to take advantage of his intelligence and strengths, and so we had a lot of those things.

Mr. Bogue is not shy and retiring and did not back off normally, but that was the very end of that whole conversation, which was intriguing to me as well.

At the same time, we were moving on the out-of-competition testing program, so that we had designed that for implementation on October 1st, 1986. That would then give me the basis upon which to move forward because we could then act -- I felt that we had a policy that was firmly passed by our association. We could move forward. So therefore, I was not prepared to necessarily spend energy on something that I had on the basis of simply that little conversation from Mr. Bogue and that kind of support on the table, to move forward in the hopes that we would be able to move forward very quickly in October 1986.

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. I take it from what you've just said that you probably would not quarrel, then, with Mr. Bogue's evidence that basically your attitude was, prove it, get the athlete to come forward with a signed affidavit and then we can do something with it?

A. No, I don't think it would have been



that hard. If I had known that it was Desai, that he had said that, we could have pursued that further, but there was no attempt on his part to bring me up into fuller information about the situation.

5 I think one of my concerns throughout this time period is the fact that individuals -- one, the York Center has been a center of controversy right from day 1. Whether it's from the OTFA vantage point, York University, this has been a difficult effort.

10 One of the difficulties, if I can elaborate, sir, for a moment, one of the difficulties with our center program and many of our programs is that we are always sharing them. We have to try to leverage resources out of someone else, which puts us in the difficult position of  
15 then not having the full control of centers, and so on.

York was an effort to try to leverage York University, the expertise that they have at that place, with support from the Ontario government through the OTFA and from our support from the federal government and  
20 ourselves. That has been a place that was our pilot. We got many things underway there, but it was a place of constant controversy. I think part of that was steeped in the fact that there were also some other factors in terms of the Scarborough Optimists and relationships with the  
25 OTFA, and so on. This was a place that was constantly



under criticism and attack throughout, not necessarily banned substances, but on a whole array of issues.

As a consequence, it is very difficult then to judge whether we have something of validity or whether they are pushed here to go after something, cause disturbances. I'm a bit sensitive about that because I've felt this throughout the association -- people have constantly been doing these kinds of things -- that I wanted to make sure that before we engage in activity, that we had something that gave us some strength to act upon, from my vantage point, that I could say to the board when they asked "Why did you pursue this?" So that's the basis of that.

Mr. Bogue, if he had said, "Well, listen, it's these individuals and --

THE COMMISSIONER: Most informants don't want to give their names out. I don't know why the name was important. It was the source of the information, where it was and what the proposal was. The name is quite unimportant.

THE WITNESS: Well, I guess another way of trying to explain the mindset from which we operated --

THE COMMISSIONER: But Mr. Bogue was a senior officer in the organization, been there for some time, quite an intelligent man, well educated, as you



know, and he wanted to take the next step.

THE WITNESS: Mr. Bogue also has, from my experience, been a man of rash judgment that I had to be careful on; as I say, also a kind of constant attack upon the system that I had to be cautious of, so I couldn't just, from my vantage point, take things at face value. I was judging within the context of the whole situation that I faced with Mr. Bogue.

I think it's also important to understand that our approach to the operations of how we operate in terms of regulations and so on is, on the one hand -- we have a very positive approach that we took with our testing program and the development of that, and what we were trying to do is expand that. On the other hand, we are based fundamentally on people coming forward with allegations, and those are then put before a hearing committee for investigation. That's fundamentally how we're structure. We just do not have any people identified in the association to play policemen roles, things of that nature. We don't have the resources for that. We take on those tasks as they come in, and then we try to pass it on to an investigative body. That's the standard operating procedure we have at our disposal, and as a consequence, I was working within that context, and that was the viewpoint.



THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Armstrong?

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. Mr. Bogue said this in the transcript,  
5 and I'm not going to read it all, and if Mr. Freedman  
thinks I haven't read enough, I'll be happy to read  
others, but in his description of his discussion with you  
at pages 8467 and 8468 of the transcript, Mr. Bogue said:

10 "Wilf's attitude was, prove it. Get the  
athlete to come forward and sign an  
affidavit. I was trying to argue the  
affidavit was no good to us. We need a  
positive test. It's going to be Desai  
against Ben, Ben against Desai. It's of no  
15 value to us at all. They'll laugh us out of  
court. We're going nowhere with it.

We have the source; let's set up a,  
like, a crime hot tip line. Let's get more  
and more athletes to come forward because  
20 they're ripe for it. Desai is coming  
forward with something, Molly is coming  
forward; they're there.

If we open up the hot line, we can find  
out exactly what is going on. So, we should  
25 at least investigate.



His reaction was that there had been  
jealous rumors about Ben before; that his  
reading of steroids indicated that the  
athletes who were at the top of the world  
should be there and they were of nominal  
help to the very top athletes."

And then he says:

"And, he said, if the athletes don't want to  
come forward, that he's not willing to act  
and that was it.

If the athlete was not willing to come  
forward and sign a paper with his name on,  
then we weren't willing to act and I  
couldn't get him to move even to the  
investigative stage, that I would go and do  
the work and find out what I could find out  
and see if I could gather enough evidence to  
prompt an inquiry, a formal inquiry."

That's his description sworn here when he testified as to  
what your attitude was as to the approach that he was  
suggesting. Now is that a fair description of what your  
attitude was at that time?

A. No, I would not say so. I did not --  
during the conversation, I don't have any recall of  
requiring an affidavit to be fined -- to be signed. I



certainly have concern that the policy of a test as the strongest method, the strongest proof that we would have, and we were working on achieving that kind of ability to test people.

5                   THE COMMISSIONER:    But previously, in all your correspondence, you asked everybody to put it in writing and outline the evidence before you would act. So that would be the same response. It's a rather consistent response.

10                  THE WITNESS:    Well, it's consistent in the sense that I do want people to come forward and allow us to put them on the record and so that we have a basis for action, yes.

15                               In the sense of the kind of investigation you're talking about --

                  THE COMMISSIONER:    Well, that's what Mr. Bogue said you were saying to him on that occasion.

20                  THE WITNESS:    Well, I think he was also getting into the viewpoint relative to my viewpoint on steroid use and athletes competencies, and so on, and that's certainly not where I'm at.

                  MR. ARMSTRONG:

25                  Q.    Did you, yourself, ask Mr. Bogue the name of his source?



A. I can't recall that I did.

Q. Then, Mr. Wedmann, moving along in the summer of 1986, we know that in September of 1986 the out-of-competition testing program was referred by the board back to committee to receive feedback from coaches, carded athletes, branches and the directors; is that so?

A. That is correct.

Q. What was the reason for that? Were you involved in that?

A. Yes, indeed. I think the position of the staff was that we wanted it for immediate implementation in October 1986. That was in response to a variety of things. I think we had just gone through three more positive tests. That obviously caused us serious concern. Sport Canada, on the other hand, was also encouraging us to move along very strongly; and I think a third factor in this was that I had been in an international congress in Stuttgart at which time we had discussions about this, and I sensed that we could have a leadership effect by going along and implementing this kind of program and then pushing the international federation because I think the start of that kind of foundation was there.

As a consequence, we asked the board in September '86 for immediate implementation of



out-of-competition testing in the sense that you made the phone call; it was in the training session; it was anywhere, anytime. We had the right to pull the name and to test these individuals within a period of time.

5                   During the discussions at the board -- actually we also added a second policy which I hope we can talk about momentarily -- but during discussions at the board, there was some concern voiced that we were ready to go. We also became rather sensitive, I think, because we  
10                   had just been to court along the Gray, Spiritoso, Dajia case, that the process, the procedures had to be very tight because they seemed to be brought into question.

                  As a consequence, I think there was some sensitivity as to whether we had in fact got it right and  
15                   that we'd like to go have a further look and get more input from the membership, basically. I wouldn't characterize it as burying it in committee or moved into committee to delay it; I would characterize it as the board wanting to get further support from the membership  
20                   on this very important issue.

                  At the time, it was not the great issue. I think that is an important factor to keep in mind. What we know today at the height of this issue is very different from what it was in the '84, '85, '86 time  
25                   period in which I was operating.



It therefore went out in November 1986. We quickly passed it along to the athletes, the carded athletes, the carded athletes' coaches, the executive directors of provincial branch, the presidents of each provincial branch, I believe some of the chief committee members and our board of directors, and we asked them for feedback by December 31st, 1986, with the intention of them bringing that information back to the March, April board meeting. As it turns out, the meeting was in April.

Q. How much feedback did you actually get?

A. We got very little. We got seven official letters back. We in fact tried to encourage -- I think we had another board meeting in between, and we tried to get the directors and the branch presidents, who I believe were at that meeting, to go back and try to stimulate further discussion and further feedback to it. I think that's an indication of the kind of intensity with which the issue was reviewed at that point in time. It simply was not the hot issue for the membership.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well just a moment, though. On the 10th of December, Mr. Dwyer, one of our prominent Canadian athletes, was quoted as saying: "It (drug use) has reached epidemic proportions." That's back on the 5th of December, 1986. So by December '86, there was a lot of discussion about the matter.



THE WITNESS: Well, I think they're isolated in the sense that Mr. Dwyer there was responding to -- I guess a reporter in Vancouver had gotten hold of our plan for implementation of out-of-competition testing and had asked him to comment upon it.

THE COMMISSIONER: I see.

THE WITNESS: He did not -- Mr. Dwyer did not officially respond to the request for reaction to the policy implementations. We basically got seven responses, as I think you have a copy of the responses that we received.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Armstrong.

THE WITNESS: If I may, there was one other element that I would like to put on the table. One of the things, when we are not able to implement immediately, I think we saw it as a positive step of perhaps educating and heightening the awareness of the membership relative to this issue, which clearly had been on a very quiet basis until then; and, as a result, we had Mr. Bogue initially, Mr. Findlay then, try to get the Athletes Council moving it along and getting them involved in deliberations on this, and they certainly began to embrace the issue and had a number of discussions. Subsequently, in fact in April when I made the report relative to the



seven responses we received, we were asked by the Athletes Council to defer immediate decisions on policies until they had another chance to immediate. So the Athletes Council was embracing it, taking up the issue at that point in time.

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. Now going back to September of 1986 when the matter was referred back to committee, were you aware of Mr. MacWilliam's firm opposition to that step?

A. I was trying to think about that. Tom and I had worked awfully close throughout 1986 there, as he was in the office quite frequently, and I can't specifically recall, although there is a sort of a nudging memory of him being very angry with the board and my response to him being that, "Listen, they have the right to seek further input, and I'm sure we're going to get it through. Let's get the input in and get it through."

Q. Well, the thrust of Mr. MacWilliam's evidence appeared to be that you had a policy in place since 1982 that included out-of-competition testing. He'd been working along on it. He said that he had a procedure in place, and there didn't seem to be any reason to delay its implementation.

Bearing in mind that you had been on the



record I think for more than four years, almost, certainly  
four years, firmly in support of out-of-competition  
testing -- you'd been working on the implementation of  
procedures -- does it now, not even out of hindsight, seem  
5 to have been an incredible waste of time to get feedback  
from seven people?

10

15

20

25



A. Well, I don't think it is ever a waste of time to get feedback from people. I think it is a very critical element.

5 If I can digress for a moment to explain the sort of orientation in which I worked. During the, as you may be aware, sir, we went through a major restructuring of the organization. We were trying to strengthen the national association. You may be aware that we have had 10 provincial associations who were very strong, and the strength of the national association was very much dependent upon how it could get its provincial association behind it.

15 And we were able, fortunately, through the work that we undertook to build a consensus through the quadrennial planning process and so on that by the time February '86 came around we were able to get a major restructuring of the organization whereby the national association was strengthened by having three additional directors at large elected at large because before that 20 the majority of the board was selected by the individual branches.

25 And so, therefore, we had this very strong provincial representative orientation on the board. And what we wanted to do was strength that so that we had a national viewpoint.



THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

THE WITNESS: As a consequence, we strengthened that. We also brought all the committees, the national committees, which prior to then very often  
5 committee members were appointed by the provincial associations and were there to represent the provincial needs, again the for territorial kind of thing. We wanted to get all those national committees responsible to the national board functioning with a national mentality.

10 We were able to get that through as well. So, we had committee restructuring which all the committee members were appointed by the Board of Directors nationally, and people could apply for it, et cetera.

15 As a result of the strengthening of the national association, one of the key elements was, however, from our vantage point, trying to make sure that the orientation of the provinces is positive and constructive and a consensus-oriented approach.

20 As a consequence, we started to work on the basis of opening up the channels of communication from provincial associations to the national and to the input to make sure that there was no fear that the national association was running away and was going to just do whatever it pleased.

25 We wanted to make sure the new approach was



institutionalized. As a consequence, we worked very hard on ensuring the provincial associations had a considerable input into the system.

5                   Part of that was, for example, making sure that on each -- we met twice a year with provincial presidents and the national Board of Directors. Part of it was meeting with a provincial staff and a national staff, first twice a year, and then we changed that to one because it was more cost effective, so that they were  
10                   aware of our plans for the future, they were aware of our evaluation of the program, and that they, therefore, had the opportunity to have input at that critical moment four or five months before the start of the next fiscal year.

                  We also tried to make sure there was a  
15                   backup system between the committees and the Board so that a Board member sat on each committee.

                  All of that was very important in terms of developing an attitude that we were going to work together on a consensus basis and build strength of viewpoints.

20                   We, therefore, also I introduced the concept that we would begin each of our policies through a discussion paper that the Board would receive and then the branches would receive, that would move to a draft policy, and would move to a final policy.

25                   In the matter of the out-of-competition



testing, we tried to speed that up. We wanted to go immediately which was different from the traditional approach that I was trying to introduce into our association. So, there would be this kind of input.

5 Whether the Board was reacting to that, I don't know, but I do believe the opportunity to have that openness is critical so that we do not have this constant warfare, we do not have this kind of negative interaction at our association. We wanted to build an association that had  
10 strength and unity, despite its diversity.

And, therefore, the opportunity for input is very, very important. As it transpired, we were starting to be able to operate very effectively, very quickly, but it was through that kind of approach that we developed an  
15 orientation that they could trust us as a national association.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Armstrong.

MR. ARMSTRONG:

20 Q. Well, I don't want to get into a philosophical debate with you, but it just seemed to me, Mr. Wedmann, that what you have said is that there was a philosophical restructuring of the organization dealing with all matters, but here going back to the specific  
25 issue of out-of-competition testing and an anti-doping



program, that was in 1986 almost history according at least to what we see on the written page.

And was there any need to have all of your philosophical restructuring go on and in effect hold up the implementation of a program that was obviously badly needed?

A. Well, two quick points -- one quick point and then the answer. This was not a philosophical restructuring, sir. This was a practical implemented operation. This is all part of changing the sport system. So, it was not philosophical, it was action-orientated, major achievements in terms of action.

In terms of the main point that you are asking, "Was there a need for this?" Yes, there was. Obviously, I took my guidance from Mr. MacWilliam and he certainly felt, because otherwise why did he propose the policies in February 1986, and the procedure was not in place. I believe what I think he calls the procedure is what I proposed as -- in the September '86 package, there is an outline I think under Section 1.2 or so that outlined the specific steps, the principles upon which we would implement random testing or out-of-competition testing.

So, it was at that point that we were introducing procedures for the first time. All the other



procedures in existence relative to doping control deal with competition testing and handling of substances related to competition testing. There were no others in place relative to out-of-competition.

5 I think that was also one of the major functions that we even once we got the policy in place we still hadn't developed the mechanics of doing that.

And, yes, certainly from our vantage point, sir, that it is unfortunate it took so long. We wanted  
10 immediate implementation, but the consensus was not there for it. And as a consequence, we went about trying to build a consensus.

Q. Well, is that right? The consensus wasn't there to establish out-of-competition testing in  
15 1986?

A. Well, if the Board had passed the September 1986 policy immediately, we would be underway, but they chose to send it back.

Q. I see.

20 A. And therefore we went through that process. And we did have opposition to it. I mean the Athletes' Council is one group was very concerned with it and the procedures that would come with it. They were prepared to go along, but they wanted to see the  
25 procedures to make sure from their vantage point they were



fair and appropriate. And at the same time I think they had some other concerns relative to things like carding and so on and tried to tie the two together.

Q. Did you ever become aware of Mr.  
5 McKinty's view as expressed to Mr. MacWilliam at that time that out-of-competition testing would not be implemented because the athletes' programs were not going to be put at risk?

A. I only heard about that, I guess, when  
10 I had dinner with Tom MacWilliam this week. So, I was not aware of that at that time, and that certainly would not reflect the orientation I had or, therefore, where we were going as a staff with regard to the Board action.

We were going forward in all seriousness,  
15 and the suggestion that we were going forward with immediate implementation I think should support that. There was no opposition from our vantage point as the staff that we wanted it delayed or we wanted -- that we felt it would put the athlete program at risk. I don't  
20 see how it would do so.

Q. Well, when you say you were going  
forward with immediate implementation, implementation didn't place until November 1988. You were still there in June of 1988 and it hadn't taken place then?

A. Well, I think we became the  
25



implementation earlier than that. The athletes were all signing the appropriate contracts and so on, and the training of collectors and all the staff was underway. So, in that sense, the implementation was beginning, sir.

5                   Q.    All right. Let's move along to another subject. When Coach Higgins, Andy Higgins of the University of Toronto Track Club appeared as a witness here, he testified that in 1987 he contacted you and requested a meeting with the staff at the University of  
10 Toronto Track Club because they wanted to clarify their position, and they were concerned with the message that seemed to be passed along to them in respect of what level of achievement was anticipated from the University of Toronto.

15                   And I think put more bluntly, Mr. Higgins suggested that there was kind of a mixed message being sent to the University of Toronto. On the one hand, they were being told that their athletes should perform without the benefit of drugs, but were being expected to live up  
20 to a standard that could only be achieved through the use of drugs. And in particular, he thought they were being expected to perform at the same standard as the York University group, and that he was concerned about that and wanted to talk to you and your organization about that.

25                   Do you recall his approaching you on that



subject in 1987?

5           A.    I don't recall him so much approaching me; I recall more from Steve Findlay suggesting that the coaches at U. of T. wanted to see me and discuss their concerns relative to York and themselves. And Steve was rather persistent, I think on a number of occasions, I was very busy at that time, but he persisted in --

          THE COMMISSIONER:   What date is this, Mr. Armstrong, that Mr. Higgins said meeting was to be?

10           MR. ARMSTRONG:   He said it was in 1987.

          THE COMMISSIONER:   All right.

          THE WITNESS:   1987?

          MR. ARMSTRONG:

15           Q.    Yes?

          A.    I have no recall -- I thought the conversation -- the meeting we had was in 1988.

          Q.    Well, as it turned out, yes, the meeting you did have was in 1988. And then let's go to Steve Findlay then. You were present during his evidence yesterday?

          A.    Yes.

          Q.    And you heard him first of all describe a conversation that he had with Andy Higgins, and then a conversation that he had with Dave Steen. And then he



said that the following week, which would have been the first week in February, on the Thursday of that week in 1988, or the Wednesday, he first had a telephone call with you, and then a discussion the following day on the Thursday in your office concerning, first of all, the situation at York, and the situation with Dr. Astaphan, Ben Johnson, Angella Issajenko, and others, and also a situation just alluded to in respect of Andy Higgins and the U. of T. and an athlete by the name of Tracy Smith.

Would you please give us your recollection of your discussions with Mr. Findlay on those subjects?

A. I don't have any specific recollections of the two meetings he was speaking of.

THE COMMISSIONER: One was a phone call --

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: And one was a phone call and one was a --

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: -- discussion when you came back to the office?

THE WITNESS: Yes, as I say, I don't have a specific recollection of that. I have two sort of recollections of that time period. And one was as you when you -- when we talked on the telephone, Mr. Armstrong, when you mentioned Mr. Astaphan and the Angella



Issajenko comment. That was one that sort of struck a nerve and reminded me that that was my understanding a story that was floating around at the competition. And so that was one of my recollections.

5                   Q.   Well, the story that floated around the competition, as I understand it, was that there some kind of miraculous performance by Angella Issajenko because she had eaten steak tartare?

10                   A.   Yes, I remembered it as in terms of Astaphan saying that Charlie had been -- I can't remember the exact words -- something to the effect that with regard to doping up Angella too heavily.

THE COMMISSIONER:   That's what --

THE WITNESS:   Yes.

15                   THE COMMISSIONER:   -- Steen told Findlay and Findlay told you?

THE WITNESS:   Well, my recollection is that that was a story as opposed to a specific connection. I did not, as I mentioned to you --

20                   THE COMMISSIONER:   Where did you hear it if you didn't hear it from Findlay?

THE WITNESS:   Well, that's what I am saying. I do not know -- I probably did hear it from Steve, and I just do not have the connection between Dave Steen being  
25   the person who Astaphan said this to. I can't recall



Steen in the conversation.

I can recall that sort of story about the competition, and then I recall Steve saying the University of Toronto coaches were very upset and wanted to talk to me about York and themselves and about what is going on down there.

As I say, in the first instance, I think -- I was overwhelmed with work at that point in time, very busy, and I was sort of reluctant to "Why don't you just deal with it with Gerard and Denis." Mr. Landry and Mr. Mach, and through normal channels. But Steve persisted, is my recollection. And as a consequence, we did then go down. I went down. I believe Mach and Landry were in the process of visiting the York Center for a Management Center Committee Meeting. So, we tied that together, and I was down at the University of Toronto for that meeting.

That's my recollection of the situation. It doesn't -- it doesn't make sense to me to -- I have no recollection whatsoever of Mr. Steen. I think Mr. Findlay said that Mr. Steen had received a vial from Mr. Astaphan. I have no recollection of that at all. And that strikes me that that would have been a natural thing for us to go and seek confirmation of the story from David Steen.

So, it doesn't make sense to me. I don't have any explanation for it.



MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. But, however, when I first raised this subject with you back in early May in a telephone conversation, you say that your memory was twiggged, at least at the time of hearing that there was some issue about Charlie Francis having doped up Angella Issajenko too much and that Astaphan had come up to straighten the situation out?

A. Yes.

Q. And that obviously must have been information that you had gotten at the time of the Toronto Sun Games in January of 1988?

A. I would presume so. And I would presume I got it from Steve. That makes sense.

Q. All right. And --

A. But as I say, the recollection in my mind was this was a story that was heard there.

Q. Now, Findlay, of course, has said that when he reiterated particularly the Steen conversation to you, your reaction simply was "that's not evidence" and that you gave no indication that you were going to do anything about it and that he made a suggestion that you Landry, Mach, and --

A. He.

Q. -- and he form a kind of brain storming



group to get together to decide what to do with this  
startling evidence.

THE COMMISSIONER: I am sorry, that was  
Findlay's suggestion, not Mr. Wedmann's suggestion?

5 THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Yes. Sorry.

THE COMMISSIONER: I am sorry, I think you  
said "he".

10 MR. ARMSTRONG: Well, I meant Findlay,  
sorry.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR. ARMSTRONG:

15 Q. His suggestion was the four of you get  
together and determine what you were going to do with this  
rather startling information, and that you didn't take up  
that suggestion?

20 A. Well, I can't recall that suggestion at  
all. It doesn't make much sense when we have got a banned  
substance solution committee in place with an individual  
involved, nor given that information that --

25 THE COMMISSIONER: Well, the banned  
substance solution committee was drafting regulations.  
This was important and vital information which Mr. Findlay  
claims --



THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: -- he was so concerned about that it disturbed him all weekend before he decided to call you on the Tuesday morning.

5 THE WITNESS: Well, from my vantage point --

THE COMMISSIONER: Then you came to the office and he had a lengthy chat with you. And as far as Findlay was concerned, this was -- obviously, if you watched him testify, this had a very dramatic effect on  
10 him.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: And he swears he told you in detail, one, perhaps less detail than the other, one shortly, perhaps, on the phone, but in detail in the  
15 meeting in the office.

THE WITNESS: Well, I can only tell you what I can recall, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: I understand.

THE WITNESS: I did not recall the Dave Steen connection. It strikes me that the Dave Steen  
20 element doesn't require Gerard Mach, and Denis Landry and Steve Findlay and I to sit down. It requires contacting Mr. Steen to confirm the story. And that, as you saw, we -- although you may not agree that some of our letters  
25 necessarily achieved the ends, but the intent would have



been to try to get confirmation as we did in those kinds of cases from Mr. Steen to the effect of the story.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, you are writing about it, which is a rather discouraging way of doing it, perhaps, to those that were trying to help, but --

THE WITNESS: Well, can I explain that perhaps --

THE COMMISSIONER: In any event, as far as your position is concerned, you never got to that stage of consideration --

THE WITNESS: Right.

THE COMMISSIONER: -- because you say you have no recollection of Mr. Findlay saying really anything until, I guess, you heard what he was going to say and recollect some story about Angella Issajenko --

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: -- being doped up by Mr. Francis --

THE WITNESS: Well --

THE COMMISSIONER: -- without any more details?

THE WITNESS: I was surprised because my recollection was very strongly that Mr. Findlay and I spent a couple of occasions there talking about going to the University of Toronto and seeing the coaches because



of their being upset.

THE COMMISSIONER: That was part of it,  
too --

THE WITNESS: That's right.

5 THE COMMISSIONER: -- because it was a  
pretty dramatic weekend for him?

THE WITNESS: Exactly, that's my  
understanding.

10 THE COMMISSIONER: As a matter of fact, the  
whole week because he had observed something himself the  
week before at a track meet --

THE WITNESS: You see, in my mind --

15 THE COMMISSIONER: -- and he speaks to the  
coaches and he has this meeting with Steen and in the  
sense what he was saying was that although he himself  
didn't want to believe the rumours, by this time he did  
believe them, and was satisfied in his own mind that they  
were substantive and not rumour.

20 THE WITNESS: Well, what I catch out of the  
conversation, my memory is the desire that we should be  
getting down to the University of Toronto and talking with  
the coaches to see what comes out.

THE COMMISSIONER: That was one aspect of  
it; he was worried about that --

25 THE WITNESS: Well, that's what stands



out in my mind. I cannot recall the Dave Steen connection.

THE COMMISSIONER: That wouldn't need a committee, nothing to do with the doping resolutions committee which you are all drafting documents?

THE WITNESS: Well, I don't think they were all drafting documents, sir. Their intent --

THE COMMISSIONER: Well --

THE WITNESS: -- their purpose --

THE COMMISSIONER: My difficulty is I come by the old school. I think if you have a got a committee of two, you have got one too many.

THE WITNESS: Sir, you haven't run a national sport organization and understand the difficulties we go through there. It isn't a matter, and I think, you know --

THE COMMISSIONER: Well --

THE WITNESS: Perhaps it is hard to understand, sir --

THE COMMISSIONER: I understand.

THE WITNESS: -- but I think it is very important --

THE COMMISSIONER: I understand, but let's go back to Mr. Findlay and the matter that Mr. Armstrong is dealing with you now.



THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Go ahead, Mr. Armstrong.  
I gather you say you really don't recollect the  
conversation, the telephone conversation or the meeting?

5 THE WITNESS: No.

THE COMMISSIONER: The discussion or the  
meeting?

THE WITNESS: Not that I can recall.

10 THE COMMISSIONER: Other than this  
vagueness about Angella Issajenko?

THE WITNESS: Right, and the coaches. I  
mean those two things are linked together in my mind.

THE COMMISSIONER: Did you hear steak  
tartare, too?

15 THE WITNESS: When that was said yesterday  
that rang a bell, yes. That was another statement that  
rang a bell.

THE COMMISSIONER: Go ahead.

20 MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. Well, recognizing that you don't  
recollect the source of some of this information as being  
Dave Steen about Angella Issajenko and Charlie Francis,  
would it not, bearing in mind the information that you had  
25 received a year and a half before, in the summer of 1986,



about Johnson, would this information that Francis was doping up Angella Issajenko and that Astaphan had come up to straighten the situation out, would that not have caused you great concern as to the present Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Track and Field Association to galvanize you in to some action on that issue?

A. Well, certainly all of this stuff gives you a sense of concern. I mean, we were very concerned about the program and about making sure that we get our system in place.

Q. Well, forget about getting the system in place. Why can't you just sort of deal with the problem at hand, that is that your athletes are breaking the rules and taking steroids and banned substances. Isn't that the issue that has to be dealt with, not the system?

A. But the issue that has to be dealt with, doesn't it, with regard to having the evidence to support that claim to bring that forward?

Sir, we have been in court with the Gray situation, we had been put in a situation where by a false move we could have gotten ourselves in difficulty even when we were in court and were successful it cost us \$13,000 that we didn't have. We are very sensitive about that kind of thing. That rings very strong in my mind.



THE COMMISSIONER: At this stage -- we are not going to advance the discussion very much if you don't remember the conversation.

THE WITNESS: Well, I don't.

5 THE COMMISSIONER: If the conversation took place as Mr. Findlay said it did, and his recollection is different than yours, then all it would require is calling Mr. Steen. We know Mr. Steen at that time was a person opposed to the use of drugs, that might have been prepared to help, and knew that the whole drug scene was a real  
10 threat to the integrity of the sport and to your association.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: And to all athletes, because they are all being tainted as Dwyer was saying.  
15

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Here is somebody who could come forth and talk to you and tell you what was said. Then you have got a direct statement, if Mr. Steen confirmed what he told Mr. Findlay what Astaphan had told him. That's direct evidence, as you know?  
20

THE WITNESS: Right. Well, that was the point I was trying to make, sir. It doesn't make sense from my vantage point that I didn't do it in light of  
25 doing it or trying seek out that evidence in other



respects.

So, I cannot recall the connection with Mr. Steen.

THE COMMISSIONER: If it was said, it didn't make an impression --

THE WITNESS: That's right.

THE COMMISSIONER: -- maybe because as you said you were very busy in those days and perhaps it didn't register; is that what you are saying?

THE WITNESS: I don't know. The recollection isn't there. It was a very intense time in terms of the work we were going through.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Armstrong.

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. Then, in any event, you were going to tell us that a meeting did take place at the University of Toronto?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. And tell us that, please.

A. The recollection is that we met, I think Carl Georgevski was there, Bob Poprawski, Andy Higgins and --

THE COMMISSIONER: What date is this? Is



this now March of --

THE WITNESS: I think it's got to be February, somewhere in the February time period. I don't have a specific -- you know, the chronology is difficult for me to remember.

THE COMMISSIONER: We are in '87, are we now?

THE WITNESS: '88.

THE COMMISSIONER: '88.

THE WITNESS: '88.

MR. ARMSTRONG: According to Mr. Higgins' evidence, the meeting took place the last week of February, the first week of March 1988.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

THE COMMISSIONER: I thought he said earlier.

MR. ARMSTRONG: No, he had requested the meeting --

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, sorry.

MR. ARMSTRONG: -- according to his evidence, in 1987, but the meeting took place, according to his evidence, the last week of February, first week of March.

THE COMMISSIONER: That will be about right, I guess.



THE WITNESS: Yes, that fits.

THE COMMISSIONER: Go ahead, Mr. Armstrong.

THE WITNESS: We met, and I think the  
other person there was the administrator for the Toronto  
Center.

And the first item of discussion was how the  
University of Toronto Center would be evaluated. We  
talked about the program and talked about the center  
being -- because we were in the process, at that point I  
was writing my evaluation report relative to quadrennial  
planning and so on, and the center was being evaluated  
quite positively at that point in time, while the athletes  
were not necessarily in great numbers coming forward with  
the objectives, but the fundamental structure of the  
center, the personnel involved, the kinds of resources  
that Mr. Higgins and company were putting together we felt  
very good. And we tried to give them the assurance that  
obviously we are committed to that center and we are  
committed for a significant amount of time. You don't  
just turn on a centre program and turn it off because  
there may be a bad year of performances and so on.

And that led into, my recollection is, a  
discussion of loosing some athletes to York Center, and  
the concern about those athletes, or athlete, at this  
point in time. And that's at the point where Mr. Higgins



brought up the issue, the concern about the size of the athletes, I think Tracy Smith was the particular person.

And that then led on to the mixed message. My understanding wasn't quite the same yours was from the conversation. I thought Mr. Higgins was saying on the one  
5 hand we are opposed to banned substances and we claim that to be case, on the other hand we praise the York Center.

And my response to that was well, until we have something that negates the performances of the  
10 athletes at the York Centre, namely a positive test or a conviction, that it is hard to ignore the performances of York Center and somehow simply put them to the side.

And we also talked about mixed messages. I felt that he was not being fair to the Association.  
15 Clearly, we had undergone now a number of changes in our policies. We had convicted four athletes in the previous two-and-a-half years. We were sending out the information to the athletes in terms of the policy changes. We were going to implement the random out-of-competition testing.  
20 It was all there. I didn't feel it was appropriate that he was necessarily saying it is mixed message, but it does cause me a concern because here is an individual who is very much in the midst of our program who is expressing this mixed message. And later on we went back - that gave  
25 me some great concern and we then talked about we were



obviously going to have to bring the message out very strongly that the out-of-competition testing program is going to be implemented and implemented strongly.

5 And as a consequence, one of the actions I took coming out of that meeting was talking to our public relations persons and saying let's get ready for a major media conference that we can make this announcement and make it very clear that out-of-competition testing is in place, and it is the strong position of the Association in  
10 opposition to it, and get that message across in any, way, shape or form. That would happen as soon as we had confirmation that we had dollars for that program.

The meeting ended then with a discussion about, you know, do you have anything -- they were quite  
15 frustrated, obviously, and I can appreciate their frustration because I am frustrated as well. I am mean people are saying things, but when it comes time to getting us something stronger, I don't really get it.

So, as a consequence, we talked about do  
20 they have anything, do they want to make a charge, do they want to lay an allegation, we will put it right to the hearing committee and they can put whatever they have before it, or can they give us something. And we received nothing at that point in time.

25 Subsequently to that then we had a meeting



or Mr. Mach and Mr. Landry then went to their scheduled meeting with the York people. And some of the substance that was discussed at the Toronto meeting was raised with the York people.

5

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. All right. And --

THE COMMISSIONER: You didn't go to York, Mr. Mach did --

10

THE WITNESS: No, I did not because part of my concern is one of the things again in terms of the administration of the organization was that I wanted to develop the concept of following the line of authority. It sounds rather bureaucratic, but on the other hand, we have a history of people trying in-run the system. And I wanted to make sure that we started following the process --

15

THE COMMISSIONER: So, Mach should have gone to York then? That would have been the basis of it, he is --

20

THE WITNESS: Mach and Landry, yes. Landry was specifically concerned with the administrative side of it, and Mach with the technical side.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. All right.

25

THE WITNESS: Yes, indeed.



MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. What information did you get from Mach and Landry as to the meeting at York?

5 A. Well, the issue of the rating of the athletes was raised. And Mr. Francis said he had proof that he had not recruited Tracy Smith. And I believe subsequently Mr. Mach got some written confirmation from Ms. Smith relative to that.

10 And Mr. Francis is supposed to have denied the use of banned substances and said something to the effect that people better watch out what they say or else they are going to find themselves in law suits. That was the primary statements that I received back relative to the U. of T. discussion.

15 Q. And do you know now looking back in to your recollection and at least appreciating that there was some information about the doping up of Angella Issajenko by Charlie Francis, was that ever put to Charlie Frances? Was there ever any --

20 A. I can't recall.

Q. -- inquiry made of him or Angella Issajenko or anybody else?

A. No, I don't believe so.

25 Q. Were you familiar before you left the organization at the end of June 1988 with Dr. Astaphan?



A. Only in the context of that discussion or that story relative to February '88. I had very little knowledge. In fact, when I started reading the stories about the split of Ben and Charlie and Astaphan, that is sort of the first source I really got of Dr. Astaphan.

Q. Did you attend the track meet in Ottawa in January of 1988 which was one week prior to the Sun meet at the Maple Leaf Gardens?

A. I may have. I am not entirely sure. I know I attended the Sherbrooke meet, but I can't recall specifically whether it was the Citizen meet, whether I did it that year or the year before. I know I attended it once during my tenure.

Q. Do you ever remember in the winter of 1988 making any observation yourself about the muscular development of Mark McKoy, Desai Williams, and Ben Johnson, and Angella Issajenko?



A. Well, they obviously had developed considerably in terms of observing their bodies. On the other hand, I think the question you're really asking is was I surprised by it. Not that I had a great surprise by it. It was just that they were developing, and Mr. Francis' program obviously was succeeding.

Q. You didn't, I take it at that time, conclude that Mr. Francis' program was succeeding because it was augmented by the use of anabolic steroids?

A. No. I weight trained a lot in my years as a high jumper. I've seen changes that happened to me, and I think on the other hand, when you look at Mr. Johnson, he's been developing over eight to ten years, and given the foundation -- I think the factor in terms of -- I'm thinking about McKoy and Desai -- the factor was that they were not under a consistent training program and the regime of a coach. Going back to Mr. Francis was viewed as a positive step by all of us in the association because we did have respect for Mr. Francis' technical abilities, not for -- certainly no view of steroid usage, but for his technical abilities, he certainly has a great deal of expertise.

Q. Then I'd like to turn back to the exhibit that we filed yesterday, Exhibit 271 I think it is, and to tab 11, and this is a letter that's already in



evidence, I believe, as a separate exhibit, 248, from Mr. Lund to Mr. Ouellette and you. The first paragraph says:

5 "1. I'm writing to you to express a personal concern which I feel that you and the CTFA must address.

2. Given my involvement and long association with Track and Field I am aware of events and occurrences in our sport.

10 3. It has recently been of an increasing frequency that athletes, coaches and administrators have expressed their concern to me with respect to the coaching and training methods and practices that are being employed and developed at the National Sprint Center.

15 4. I would like at this time to request than an assurance be given to the CTFA Board of Directors at our next meeting by the President and the National Coach and High Performance Director that all aspects of the Sprint Centre's operation is being done within the existing rules of the IAAF and the CTFA.

20 5. Please treat this request as being serious."



Then he says he wants the matter dealt with at the next board meeting.

"7. In this instance, I assume that the National Coach is fully aware of the Sprint Centre's operation. If this is not the case then he should do what is necessary to satisfy himself and the Board with respect to the continued integrity of the sport of Track and Field."

And then I take it you received the original of this letter from Mr. Lund?

A. Yes.

Q. And then if we look at tab 12, there is another letter with a date stamp on it, "Received March 22 1988".

THE COMMISSIONER: That's new. We haven't had that before.

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. We haven't had this before, and it says:

"Dear Wilf, the operation of the Sprint Centre and its coaches and athletes are being scrutinized by all aspects of our society."



I just want to be assured that we (Sport and Board) will not be embarrassed. If what is being discussed openly in Toronto is true, then we must take steps to rectify the situation.

The rules are ours, and I want to be able to ask Gerard and get a reply from him before the entire Board of Directors.

Please give me a call re this! Rolf."

Then there is a note at the top of the letter.

THE COMMISSIONER: "The letter has gone to Jean-Guy and yourself only!"

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. Yes. You obviously received a copy of this handwritten letter that I've just read?

A. Yes.

Q. And upon receipt of those letters, what did you do?

A. Well the first step, I think, Mr. Lund was wanting to put on the board agenda -- at that time, we were already preparing a package for the board agenda and the materials that go with it. I knew that banned substances were going to be discussed during the board meeting because I believe we had the Gray reinstatement



issue there, as well as Rob Lonigan (phon), the athletes' rep., wanted to make a presentation on that. So I left -- I did not address it in terms of putting it on the agenda. Specifically it was there already, and Mr. Lund would be free to bring it up and left it at that.

And subsequently to that, because again during this time I was in the process of -- I had resigned, but I was in the process of finishing off the board meeting, finishing off a number of other things, but I was also in the process of taking extended holidays during this period to use up my time, so I got around to replying formally to Mr. Lund on the 3rd of May.

Q. All right. Mr. Lund testified that when he arrived in Sudbury for the April board meeting, that he had a conversation with Ouellette and you and that you indicated you were still looking into the problem and discussing it with the people at the Sprint Center at York; is that the case?

A. I have no recollection of that.

Q. And he also says that you and Ouellette indicated that you were going to have a meeting with Mach, Francis -- there was going to be a meeting of Mach, Francis and Jean-Guy Ouellette and that you thought it was a good idea for Jean-Guy and Gerard to speak to Charlie because of their relationship with him?



A. I have no recollection of that conversation myself. I can't comment upon that.

Q. All right. Did the matter get raised, in your recollection, at the April board meeting? Were you at it?

A. I was at the April board meeting, yes. To the best of my recall, I don't think it was raised. We talked about the reinstatement cases, and we talked about Mr. Lonigan's (phon) submission on behalf of the Athletes Council, and I believe we also talked at that time about the Dr. Stanish article that appeared. A number of the board members were concerned with the letter and wanted us to take some action, which I had already taken.

That's the recall I have of what transpired at the board meeting. I don't recall Mr. Lund bringing the subject on the table and dealing with it.

Q. All right, then, in your response on May the 3rd --

THE COMMISSIONER: There is a minute of the board meeting at that time. Did that occur at that meeting? There is a minute, I recall, of Mr. Lund asking questions?

MR. ARMSTRONG: Well, it's a later -- it's Exhibit 249, and I think it's --

THE COMMISSIONER: I know where it fits in.



MR. ARMSTRONG: I think it's a board meeting in October.

THE COMMISSIONER: Oh, I see. It is October, thank you. I'm sorry. I was ahead of my time here.

You are returning to the letter which is tab 13, Mr. Armstrong, right?

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. And you say:

"Dear Rolf, thank you for your letters re the York Centre.

With respect to your request for assurances that we will not be embarrassed, I cannot give you such assurances."

Now what did you mean by that?

A. Well, the association certainly does not control all our athletes and coaches in its fullest extent, so whatever Mr. Rolf meant by "embarrassment", I could not assure that each of those athletes or coaches or other personnel who behave in a fashion that would not be embarrassing in that association. I just do not have that kind of control and the association does not have that kind of control over its personnel and its members. So it was said from that simple vantage point, that we just can



not give those kind of assurances.

Q. Well, if you look at what Mr. Lund was saying back in his handwritten note at tab 12, he's saying:

5 "I just want to be assured that we...will not be embarrassed. If what is being discussed openly in Toronto is true, then we must take steps to rectify the situation."

10 What he's saying is, I suggest to you, is that "I don't want our organization to be embarrassed in the sense that I don't want us to be seen as having done nothing to rectify, to act in respect of this information that is being discussed openly in Toronto, which we know is a discussion that apparently, along with steroids being  
15 rampant themselves, the discussion seems to be rampant that steroids are being used there"?

A. Well, and I responded to him to give me any of that information. I presumed from the reference to the discussions openly in Toronto, I presumed that he was  
20 talking about the nature of the discussion we had with the U. of T. coaches, and that's why the reference in the letter to that.

Q. In any event, I take it that -- let's just go back to your letter, for the moment. In the  
25 fourth paragraph, you say:



"I also spoke to both Gerard and Jean-Guy who both have a relatively close relationship with Francis and asked them to ensure Charlie is aware of these stories and that the CTFA would act firmly in accordance with our rules if any evidence is produced. I hoped that these discussions with Charlie would ensure he realized what is being said about him and his athletes and what the consequences would be if any allegations were proven following due process."

I take it your response to Lund simply was to tell him that there had been the meeting with the U. of T. coaches as indicated in the second paragraph?

A. Yes.

Q. And that you asked Jean-Guy Ouellette and Gerard Mach simply to have a firm discussion with Charlie and tell him to be a good boy, if I can put it that way? Maybe that's an unfair characterization of it, but tell him that he'd be dealt with sternly if he was found out?

A. Yes, and that we were concerned about these rumors and the basis for them and that he should understand we clearly that we were opposed to banned substance usage and that if anything comes forth, we're



going to act.

Having denied it -- Mr. Francis has denied it on a number of occasions, and having just denied it to Mr. Mach, it was a matter of how can we discreetly keep reinforcing this principle to Mr. Francis who is constantly denying the use of substances and we not having anything firm to be moving on.

THE COMMISSIONER: "If people don't have evidence or personal knowledge to which they are prepared to swear before a hearing, I wish they would refrain from speaking out publicly."

You are always looking for somebody who is going to come forth and publicly testify when the real question was whether you should be doing everything you could to investigate the matter before you have a public hearing. You don't get to a public hearing in the first case. The public hearing is after the investigation, not before.

THE WITNESS: Right. Well, I think as I mentioned before, the way we have traditionally operated is on the basis that we operate on the basis of some allegation being put forward to an investigative hearing body. We're not set up in the policing kind of approach, nor do we have that kind of expertise.

So we were working consistent with an



approach that we had in place and trying to do the best that we can, concerned with the resources we have, concerned with the legal situation that we face nowadays as opposed to the discussions perhaps in earlier times relative to sport people and coaches and so on getting together. We live in a very different era now where when you wish to discipline someone, the lawyers are there, and it becomes a whole different kind of ballgame. That has an impact on us in terms of the mentality --

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, you can't blame the legal process if there has been a failure to investigate.

THE WITNESS: Well, I'm not blaming the legal process, sir. I'm just saying that's a factor that's at play in how we operate and how we thought at that time.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, one should have regard for a person's legal rights, I agree with you, but to investigate is not depriving anybody of any legal rights.

THE WITNESS: No, but I guess where I was coming from was the fact that I wanted something to have a basis of investigation, and the rumors and so on -- once again, I mean when I look at the Rolf Lund letter, I've had difficulty of understanding what the motivation



clearly is. Again, he's representing an organization that has consistently and persistently battled the York Center, been in conflict with the Scarborough Optimists, been in conflict with Mr. Francis and Mr. Earl and so on. It's  
5 hard, you know, separating the strains and knowing whether we have something substantial.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I pointed out to Mr. Lund, I didn't think the letter was that specific, but he said you would understand what he meant.

10 THE WITNESS: Well I took him -- as I said, I took him to be referring to the U. of T. I suspected that Mr. Higgins, perhaps not being satisfied with my response, is now taking it to the director, and that's certainly consistent with our association, the way we  
15 would operate.

My frustration is that we then asked Mr. Lund to become more specific, to give us some direction, and we certainly would move on it. That's not my -- the intention was to have something soluble, to move along,  
20 and I have a concern about having something substantive to move on so I'm not accused later on.

THE COMMISSIONER: I understand. Thank you.



MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. Just going back for a moment to the conversation that you had, as you recollect it, in 1986 with Glenn Bogue, do you have any recollection, apart from  
5 his having mentioned Ben Johnson, that Charlie Francis was also involved in providing steroids to other athletes or banned substances to other athletes?

A. Well the conversation began with Mr. Bogue saying Charlie was pushing this upon young athletes  
10 at the Center, but that was the extent of the statement.

Q. And I take it, starting with that information with Bogue, the information that you got through the years, the discussions, the concerns expressed about the York Center, about Charlie Francis, the  
15 information about Angella Issajenko being doped up, none of that appears to have raised your concern to the point to take more specific action other than simply the meeting with the U. of T. coaches and requesting people from time to time to put their statements in writing?

A. Well, I think it's a two-fold approach. On the one hand, we were working to get the  
20 out-of-competition testing in place, and that, to my mind, was our fundamental approach.

You know, Mr. Bogue was quite right. When  
25 you have a positive test, you've got very strong evidence,



and you're not putting yourself in a situation where it's either easy to get out of that. As long as we maintain the integrity of the sample, and so on, and follow process properly, we should be very fine. So that, to me, was our number 1 approach and number 1 concern.

Yes, unfortunately it took more time than we would have liked, but that was the reality we faced, and I believe Mr. Savage has explained to you the course of actions that expired.

The second approach was then to work consistent with a policy which was that if people have an allegation they wished to put forward relative to a specific member or put some evidence forward, we would proceed with it.

THE COMMISSIONER: They may not wish to put it forward. They may do it reluctantly, but I think it would be in your interest to have them put it forward, whether they wished to or not, if you found out that they had something, to pursue it, and it should be your wish to get the evidence rather than their desire to give it? There is a difference, you know.

THE WITNESS: Yes, I recognize the difference. I also recognize the fact that our association, in separating the rumors, separating the issues out to get at whether we in fact have something of



a substantive nature here, is a very difficult task, and that's where I was coming from to make sure -- in a sense, trying to make sure that we protect the association from the vantage point of having something -- when we expend  
5 these energies -- you've heard me repeat it over and over, sir, and it's not done as an excuse. It's done as the reality within which we work: the resources; both my time or our staff time. I believe we are understaffed. We are under-resourced in it's -- under-resourced on the  
10 volunteer side, et cetera. These put limitations, and it's within that broader context. This was not my full-time job. It was an aspect of it. That's the reality within which we work, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Mr.  
15 Armstrong.

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. Finally, just to pick up that thread, obviously when you had the conversation with Bogue, it  
20 didn't occur to you to say to Bogue, "Well, look, this is a serious matter, and I don't care who that source is. I want you to tell me who it is, and I think we should call that person in because he's obviously at York Center. He's under our jurisdiction as a member of the Canadian  
25 Track and Field Association. We put time and resources



into that organization. It's our pilot project. I want to know who that person is, and I want to get to the bottom of this. Now, Bogue, tell me who it is and let's get him or her down here tomorrow morning"? That didn't occur to you?

A. It didn't occur because that wasn't the context within which I was working when I sat down or was standing in his office discussing the whole conversation.

In some ways, you could almost call it at times a discordant conversation. We're talking about something and he enters into this potentially very serious situation. He doesn't follow it. He doesn't pursue it with me. In that very small context he brings it up in the middle of another conversation; and knowing Mr. Bogue and his past track record, I judged it how serious, and I didn't necessarily judge it as terribly serious at that time. In retrospect, it perhaps is a different kind of perspective.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Those are all the questions I have.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. All right, we'll take a short break now.

--- A short break was taken.



--- Upon resuming.

THE COMMISSIONER: Have you completed your examination, Mr. Armstrong?

5 MR. ARMSTRONG: Yes, I have. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Mr. Freedman first.

MR. FREEDMAN: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

10

--- EXAMINATION BY MR. FREEDMAN:

15

Q. Mr. Wedmann, I want to take you back first to your background with respect to the issue of the use of banned substances. Can you tell the Commissioner what exposure you had to that issue as an athlete, first of all?

20

A. Virtually non-existent aside from having been in weight rooms. As an athlete, from time to time one would hear something about Dianabol, but other than that, no real knowledge at all. I, to my knowledge, never met anyone that was involved with steroids.

Q. And you hadn't come into contact, I take it, yourself with banned substances in your competition days?

25

A. Not that I'm aware of.



Q. Now what about when you became an administrator of the B.C. Track and Field Association beginning in 1983, I believe?

5 A. I think the only involvement we had was as we began to do competition testing. As a host province we have been involved, but other than that, no real involvement at the provincial level.

Q. So prior to your becoming manager of the CTFA, how would you describe your expertise or  
10 knowledge level of banned substances at that time?

A. Virtually non-existent. It was not a subject that was in my realm of possibilities, that I was aware of. Actually, after all of this had taken place, I began to reflect back on it and realized that that simply  
15 wasn't a concept in my frame of operations.

Q. Let's talk a little bit about your responsibilities as general manager and then president. We focused this morning on your role vis-a-vis the issue of banned substances, but I take it there were other  
20 responsibilities you had as general manager and later president?

A. Very much so. Actually, we had a very significant time period of considerable change within the association, change in terms of reorganizing ourselves, rearranging the association to try to strengthen its  
25



ability to operate. We were involved in the World Junior Championships and some of the things that happened there. We were involved with an international campaign to change the junior age issue. We became involved with a campaign  
5 to include race walking, women's race walking in the Commonwealth Games and assisting Ms. Peel in her campaign.

We were involved in changing many of the whole ways of operating as an association. One of the key  
10 keys elements out of the quadrennial planning had been that we wanted to restructure ourselves, be more businesslike and function in that function. We had also gone through a management review by Coopers and Lybrand in '84 which talked about how the board and the association should be operating. I took all of that very seriously  
15 and tried to implement that to the greatest degree possible.

We also introduced quadrennial planning to try to get us out of a kind of reactive mode and develop a more planning orientation, and with that, of course, came  
20 more of a monitoring evaluation orientation which tried to put us much more in control of our operations. The other key element was to develop a stronger policy orientation.

As we changed the corporation to give more responsibility and authority to the staff, what was very  
25 important was to ensure that the staff was clearly



directed as to the kinds of actions that it can could be involved in. Hence, policies were critical to define the guidelines for staff action.

Q. What was the size of the staff you were managing when you first --

A. I think when I first started, about 16, and by the time I was leaving, it was about 20 or 21.

Q. And what was size of your annual budget that you administered?

A. When I began, it was around the \$2 million mark, and I believe by the time I was leaving, it was around the \$3 million mark.

So we were changing very fast and trying to sort of grapple with developing a management system in this time period of extreme change that Don Fletcher also was alluding to from 1981 onwards.

Q. After you took up the position of manager, what was your first real significant exposure to the issue of the use of banned substances?

A. It was addressing the positive test of Harold Willers and going through the whole process of confirmation of the B test and then taking him through the suspension hearings and the appeal process and so on.

Q. Can you tell the Commissioner a little bit more about the appeal process? What had transpired



there?

A. Well, B.C. Athletics, because Mr. Willers was from British Columbia, it was, under our rules, the agency that should be doing the investigation.

5 THE COMMISSIONER: That's like the OTFA counterpart?

THE WITNESS: Exactly. So the B.C. Athletics' executive conducted a hearing into the positive test of Mr. Willers and came to a conclusion that in fact  
10 he had taken the substances, and as a consequence, handed down a one-year suspension.

In the brief that I presented to them for their review --

15 THE COMMISSIONER: What was the substance that he used or they had found him to have taken?

THE WITNESS: I think it was 19-nortestosterone or something of that nature. It is a steroid substance.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right.

20 THE WITNESS: And as a consequence of B.C. Athletics handing down a one-year sentence, I felt that that was inappropriate. I had guided them in the brief I presented to them, that if they do find the individual guilty, that they would then have to apply the  
25 international standard which was that the individual had



rendered himself ineligible from all domestic and international competitions -- kind of an open-ended ruling at that point in time -- with the right for reinstatement or appeal for reinstatement after 18 months.

5                   So as a consequence, when B.C. Athletics had in fact handed down the one-year sentence, I appealed that to our own board of directors to ensure that we had the appropriate sentence put in place.

10                   Q.    So do I get it fairly, then, that you were not satisfied that the penalty imposed by the B.C. Track and Field Association was harsh enough?

15                   A.    Well harsh enough, but it was really from the vantage point of trying to do one's job. The penalty called for a different penalty than had been handed down, and as a consequence, through my interaction with Mr. Willers, I saw how much pain and suffering he had gone through with this whole experience, and he certainly had recanted; but the fact of the matter was that the rule had said he should be rendered ineligible from all  
20 competition. So I appealed to our own board to ensure that that policy was put in place.

                  Q.    And just so that we have it, what was the outcome?

25                   A.    I lost. The board sustained the B.C. decision.



Subsequently, however, as a result of forwarding that to the International Amateur Athletic Federation, they informed us that that wasn't acceptable, so really the 18-month suspension stood.

5 Q. Now what was the timing of all of this? When did this occur?

A. This took place in the July to February, July '85 to February '86 time period in terms of the whole process.

10 Q. And during that period of time, would you have had the discussion that Mr. Bogue testified to?

A. No. That simply does not at all ring true, and it doesn't ring true because I was general manager at that time also, and I think he had made it very explicit that I was --

15

THE COMMISSIONER: You say it was a later date?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

20 MR. FREEDMAN:

Q. Now the next major involvement with a positive test was when for you?

A. It was June 1986 with the Rob Gray, Peter Dajia, Mike Spiritoso.

25 Q. I just want to ask you, we heard from



Mr. Savage in describing the U.S. policy of testing everyone prior to a competition. He described that as an anti-embarrassment policy. Can I ask whether you have a view as to how you react to a positive test or what your perception is of a positive test?

A. My own view is that it simply proves that we're doing what we should be doing, and I do not take it as an embarrassment necessarily that when someone fails to abide by our rules and we find the individual to be guilty that that's necessarily a major embarrassment for the association.

I feel very good that the random testing program, the out-of-competition testing program did in fact prove to be valid and we found someone in the process, and I think that's a positive statement for the Canadian Track and Field Association, not an embarrassing statement.

It is tragic that we have these cases and we have to do this. That's the tragedy, but I guess that's the point I trying to get at with regard to Mr. Lund. I can't assure every individual is abiding by the rules. We can only try our best to put in place the rules and the detection methods.

Q. We've heard evidence at this Commission that Mr. Gray sought an injunction against the suspension



that was handed down by the CTFA. Can you just tell the Commissioner briefly what your involvement was with that court application?

5 A. Well I, with the assistance of Glenn Bogue, worked with Mr. Laskin to try to put our case together as quickly as possible to respond to the injunction; so I think ultimately I was the individual that swore the presentation.

Q. Were you cross-examined?

10 A. I was reviewed by Mr. Gray's lawyers for discovery, I believe it's called, an evening.

Q. Now Mr. Bogue testified that his conversation with you about his sources at York Center was about a three-hour conversation. Can you tell the  
15 Commissioner what your recollection is as to how long that conversation lasted?

A. I have no recollection of a three-hour conversation. To my mind, it was relatively brief. It was, as I said, in the context of a larger conversation,  
20 and I don't recall at all that we kept Mr. Bogue's wife waiting, as he suggested.

Q. In answer to some questions from Mr. Armstrong this morning, you suggested that the context within which you had your discussion with Mr. Bogue was  
25 that at that time you didn't have a lot of faith or didn't



put a lot of faith in Mr. Bogue's judgment. Can I just ask you, you mentioned something about, I believe, an annual general meeting. Can you please expand on that a little bit?

5                   A.    Well, I think Mr. Bogue himself referred to it. One of my first unfortunate tasks was to cite Mr. Bogue for insubordination. The board -- after the annual general meeting it was -- which Mr. Bogue had worked with our athlete representatives and challenged  
10                   some of the policies and the budget process and so on, that the board had cited Mr. Bogue for insubordination, and that in fact was one of my first duties upon coming on after the Harold Willers situation.

                  But Mr. Bogue, he's young, and he had a lot  
15                   of energy and he had a very strong view and we tried to work together, and I think the association got much good out of him; but on the other hand, he did have a tendency at times to be rash and to act without full judgment, full consideration of all the facts, so --

20                   THE COMMISSIONER:   Well, that's a matter of who was acting rashly one way or the other at that time, whether it was you or Mr. Bogue.

                  THE WITNESS:   Well as I say, it was a  
judgment call in terms of Mr. Bogue's past behavior and  
25                   information he gave me and in the context within which he



gave me.

THE COMMISSIONER: Go ahead.

MR. FREEDMAN:

5 Q. You said this morning that it was  
intriguing to you that Mr. Bogue didn't come back to you  
on the issue of York Center. Can I just ask you to  
explain more fully why you found that intriguing?

10 A. Well, Mr. Bogue and I had many  
extensive discussions, and he had strong beliefs and he  
expressed them, and certainly within the association,  
within the office where I worked, I tried to ensure that  
we encouraged that or allowed that to happen because it  
was out of the free exchange that we were going to get the  
15 best decision.

So Mr. Bogue certainly took advantage of  
that, and he and I engaged in numerous discussions. So he  
was not one to shy back when he felt very strongly about  
an issue.

20 Q. I gather that Mr. Bogue resigned from  
the CTFA shortly after asking you for a raise; is that  
correct?

A. Yes, it is.

25 Q. Mr. Bogue has testified that he asked  
you for a \$4,000 increase and that you were not prepared



to grant him that. Can I ask what your recollection is as to what he asked for in terms of salary and the context of it?

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A. Well, Mr. Bogue -- one of the tasks upon coming in, we did not have a standard salary system nor a standard kind of organizational structure in terms of the positions within the association, the responsibilities and how that related to the salary system. So, during the first year of my tenure there, I began to develop with the assistance of the staff a salary system and a sort of management structure.

As a result of that, Mr. Bogue's position was identified not as an Athlete Services Manager, which it was when I came in, but as an Athlete Services Coordinator, and that position was pegged at a certain salary scale, the top of which, I believe, was something in the order of \$29,000.00.

Mr. Bogue wanted almost \$10,000.00 greater than that. I think the number that comes to mind is \$38,000.00. And I simply was not able to give him that kind of assurance. I did inform him that I felt the position could evolve and develop because one of the things we did want to do was do a better job of servicing our athletes so that we would make them more of a team orientation. And that was for the future, but at that point in time his tasks were not simply at the manager level, and as a consequence his salary scale was applicable was limited to the top scale of some



\$29,000.00.

THE COMMISSIONER: That's all set forth in  
tab 14, I think.

THE WITNESS: I believe so, yes.

5

MR. FREEDMAN:

Q. Yes. I just want to turn up tab 14,  
and obviously, the Commissioner is familiar with that  
document. I take it that this is a letter you sent to Mr.  
10 Bogue asking for his comments on the organization?

A. Yes, he was still on staff. He in  
mid-October tendered his resignation --

THE COMMISSIONER: I am sorry, I have got  
the letter -- yes. Well, that's the letter accepting his  
15 resignation, this one.

THE WITNESS: Yes, the 21st of October.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes?

THE WITNESS: He had submitted it a week  
earlier and was leaving at the end of the month.

20 THE COMMISSIONER: Right.

THE WITNESS: During that time he had also  
mentioned that offer of an exit interview, I think, since  
he and I probably had a lot of discussion and --

THE COMMISSIONER: What's an exist  
25 interview? It is a new term for me.



THE WITNESS: Well, when staff members leave there an opportunity to sit down and sort of give whatever guidance the outgoing staff member would like to give to the association or the company.

5 THE COMMISSIONER: Right.

THE WITNESS: I felt that rather than having another discussion, that it might be more useful that it he wrote down his concerns or his suggestions for the association that he would give some more thought to it and he could certainly leave us with whatever views he felt were appropriate, because he had very strong views, and I was quite prepared to have them. So, I invited him at the end there to give us that kind of final legacy, if you will.

15 MR. FREEDMAN:

Q. Did you receive any answer to your letter of October 21, 1986?

A. No, I did not.

20 Q. Now, we have had entered into evidence at this Inquiry as Exhibit No. 260, behind tab 14, the policies that were presented to the Board of Directors of the CTFA in September of 1986. I would just like to turn up those for a moment with you.

25 There's been a great deal of discussion



about the policy that dealt with out-of-competition testing. It is my understanding that at that Board meeting you presented a second policy as well. Is that correct?

5                   A.    Yes, it is.

                  MR. FREEDMAN:   And I believe, Mr. Commissioner, you will find that beginning in the seventh page in behind tab 14.

                  THE COMMISSIONER:   Thank you.

10                  MR. FREEDMAN:    Exhibit 260 was the Exhibit book of Mr. MacWilliam.

                  THE COMMISSIONER:   Yes. What tab, please?

                  MR. FREEDMAN:    Tab 14 beginning at the seventh page in.

15                  THE COMMISSIONER:   All right. Thank you.

                  MR. FREEDMAN:

                  Q.    This is a document entitled a Doping Reinstatement Policy. Can you tell the Commissioner, Mr. Wedmann, what this policy is and what involvement you had with it.

20

                  A.    Well, one of the -- as a result of having now four positive tests, looking and reflecting back, one of the concerns that arose, and I think Tom MacWilliam and I spent some time on this as well broadly

25



discussing it, one of things that arose was in fact our  
punishment serving as an effective deterrent. We just had  
four cases in almost -- well, almost 13 months. And  
reviewing that felt that perhaps 18 months was not an  
5 appropriate deterrent. It was not getting people to think  
about this and reflect upon this as a deterrent in an  
effective way.

I know that my interactions with Mr. Willers  
and with Mr. Gray and others, I know that the whole  
10 function of suspension and the things that go with it is a  
very traumatic experience and they certainly did go  
through some pain and suffering out of that, but that  
doesn't get communicated in the policy.

So, it was my view that perhaps we should be  
15 strengthening the minimum period of suspension and thereby  
in essence bringing the point home that we take this very  
serious, much more serious than simply an 18-month pat on  
the back. And I suggested that the minimum period of  
suspension for steroid usage be three years plus  
20 Olympic -- one Olympic Games plus one world championship  
to drive home very seriously those are the two major  
events in an athlete's career --

THE COMMISSIONER: Three years could be  
included? It was three years but --

25 THE WITNESS: Yes, it could be included.



THE COMMISSIONER: -- you must skip one Olympic and World Championship?

THE WITNESS: Exactly. So that we drive it home that there was that.

5                   The other problem, of course, was getting information. And to that extent, we also suggested that athletes would only be considered for reinstatement, I believe, if they were prepared to give us the information as to where they got the substance, how they got it, any  
10 counselling, and things of that nature.

                  We also wished the athlete to be part of a doping education program so that they would become part of it and hopefully become a public convert to an anti-doping approach. And finally we wanted the individual to be part  
15 of an out-of-competition testing program for several years before reinstatement and --

THE COMMISSIONER: Was all this approved?  
Was all this approved? Or I don't think it was.

20                   THE WITNESS: Unfortunately not, at least from my vantage point. This was an effort to sort of strengthen the view relative to anti-doping, as well as to put us in a better position to get better information and, perhaps, use converts more effectively in a positive step.

25



MR. FREEDMAN:

Q. What was the extent of your involvement in the formulation of this draft policy?

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, it says it was presented by him.

THE WITNESS: It was fundamentally my presentation. It was as a result of discussions with a number of people but whereas the previous document was very much a team effort of Mr. McKinty, Mr. Bill MacWilliam, and my involvement at the tail end of that. This was one was my contribution.

MR. FREEDMAN:

Q. You say this policy was not approved?

A. Well, it was -- it went to same process of that was undertaken with regard to the out-of-competition testing. And therefore was referred back for further discussion, was sent out to the athletes and the coaches, and then was continued. And we kept it on the table, but it really didn't get anyone's attention. I myself conducted a poll with our provincial branch Executive Directors and found no support for it going anywhere beyond the international standard at that time.

THE COMMISSIONER: Which was what, 18 months?



THE WITNESS: Yes, the eligibility for reinstatement after 18 months, yes.

MR. FREEDMAN:

5 Q. I want to take you now to the meeting you had in March of 1988 with the University of Toronto coaches and others. You mentioned this morning that the first concern raised was -- a concern raised by the coaches was how were they going to be evaluated. And can  
10 you just explain that a little more fully what you meant by that?

A. It was more a concern of how the center itself would be evaluated. We were strengthening our evaluation process very much as part of the quadrennial  
15 planning process. So, there was --

Q. Just let me interrupt you, what was the criteria for evaluation of which there was concern?

A. I don't know what their concern was, but there was a set criteria in our events center policy  
20 that identifies the kinds of things we would be expecting to see from our centre programs or centres over time.

Q. Was that based on athletic performance to a certain extent?

A. To some degree, but it is really based  
25 upon developing a full infrastructure. Athletic



performance is certainly part of it, the number of athletes you have at certain levels in your program, but on the other hand, one of the real critical parts was developing a structure because these centres are -- need to have a strong infrastructure. You need to have strong financial backers, strong facilities, sport medicine, sport science support. So, tying it with the universities hopefully gave us that as well, but you then had to develop a relationship with the university and the center people came together effectively.

And the University of Toronto, I guess, as we were going through the evaluation process, had some concerns, particularly in light of perhaps losing an athlete or two.

Q. I just want to read to you briefly an excerpt from Mr. Bogue's evidence in response to some questions put to him in cross-examination by Mr. Bourque and get your reaction to it.

And I am reading, Mr. Commissioner, from page 8501 of the transcript.

And Mr. Bourque was discussing your relationship as President to the Board of Directors.

"MR. BOURQUE:

Q. Well, he still could have been fired by the Board, could he not?



A. Yes.

Q. The Board had that domain over him?

A. Yes.

Q. And I suggest to you he was, in fact,  
5 subject to the direction of the Board if  
they wanted to tell him to do something, is  
that not correct?"

THE COMMISSIONER: Who is "he"?

MR. FREEDMAN: "He" is Mr. Wedmann.

10 THE COMMISSIONER: I see.

MR. FREEDMAN:

Q. "A. No.

"Q. He could thumb his nose at the Board  
15 if they wanted him to do something in  
particular, is that your evidence?

A. I believe that was the case. He was  
the chief executive officer and the new  
supreme authority of CTFA.

20 Q. He was not reviewable by the Board in  
any way except that he could be fired by  
them?"

A. That is fairly accurate.

Q. That's your understanding?

25 A. That's my understanding."



And I ask whether you agree with Mr. Bogue's understanding of the degree of your unaccountability to the Board of Directors?

5 A. Not at all. I am accountable in a very straightforward fashion as anybody is to a Board of Directors. I got reviewed on one occasion in midterm and very much accountable, but not only that, but very sensitive to the fact that I think Mr. Bogue missed the point that we were undergoing very significant change in terms of the structure of the association. With it came the responsibility to ensure that support for this change would be continued and forthcoming further, and that the change would in fact be institutionalized because we were moving to a great involvement of the staff and greater responsibility of the staff vis-a-vis the volunteer system. And volunteers are awfully critical to us. We can't exist without the volunteers. They are absolutely critical, but there was a point of friction.

10 So, I took that in a very serious way, and, yes, the Board is supreme. And certainly on a number of occasions, I lost my presentations to the Board. Sobeit, that's the way the system works.

15 Q. We have looked over the past few days on a number of occasions at the letters between yourself and Mr. Lund. And I just want to have it for the record



your May 3, 1988 letter in which you asked Mr. Lund to either provide you with any information he had of the use of banned substances or information that he knew others had to you. Did you ever receive a response in that regard from Mr. Lund?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Mr. MacWilliams, when he testified, talked about his taking up a new position in Saskatoon. Can I ask whether you have any knowledge as to how it came to be that Mr. MacWilliam took a position in Saskatoon once he left the CTFA in Toronto or Ottawa, rather?

A. Mr. Lund left the CTFA, I believe, in 1984 and for the subsequent year, year and a half, had been looking for new kind of position in the National Sport and Recreation Center amongst one of the sports.

He had taken on some part-time contracts, some with the CTFA to continuing working on our doping control system. I believe he also had a contract with OTFA to do some work for them. But he was looking for work and was not finding the position that he really wanted in the sport system in Ottawa, and I believe at that point in time the opportunity arose in Saskatoon. And my understanding is he took it at his own volition.

Q. Do you know whether he applied for that position?



A. I would have suspected there would have been some kind of application process involved and selection process.

5 Q. In order to assist the work of the Commission, can I ask you, sir, whether you have put any thought in to the way in which track and field should be administered in the future and whether you have got anything you would like to share with the Commission in that regard?

10 A. Well, I have a number of points if the Commissioner would like to hear them at this point in time.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

15 THE WITNESS: I have been watching the proceedings of the Commission very carefully and closely because it is obviously a subject close to my heart, the sport of track and field. And I have heard people talking about money and the desire to win and all these things and I would like to suggest one of the critical elements, of  
20 course, in the association is the developing a sound ethical base. And when we have that, money and competition are -- we can work that into the framework.

25 And one of the things I would like to share with you, sir, is in 1984 as part of our strategic planning, we, in fact, began looking at the whole issue of



trying to articulate the values and beliefs of the Association.

We were defining goals and missions of what we want to do, but what we wanted to also do was to establish the framework within which we would do it, basically our values and beliefs in an ethical system.

Unfortunately, we began to implement that and that fell by the wayside as a result of the pressures of getting on with the operational planning and not getting a terribly good response from our members who perhaps saw it as bit of an airy-fairy. I think in retrospect a statement and a very clear definition of what we believe is very important to our Association, and I think that's an area which deserves more attention.

And more communication. And that is also one of problems that I think that I have observed as we have watched the proceedings here, the surprise at which there are sort of many different levels understanding of the association, of its actions by the various individuals.

Tragically in our tight financial restraints I even had to cut our expenditures relative to our monthly newsletter or bi-monthly newsletter, as it turned out at the end.

And clearly there is a need to make sure we



communicate effectively our values and beliefs and we  
communicate effectively what the association is doing so  
the membership understands that. And that unfortunately  
is going to take a lot of resources to do that, but I  
5 think our limitations limited us in the ability to get  
that message out and across. Even when you hear someone  
like an insider like Andy Higgins saying we were sending  
mixed messages, that is a real concern. And this is  
hopefully a couple of methods that should address it.

10 I think another issue that we raised, and  
you have pointed out to me, is the whole issue of  
investigation and so on. And over the years, I think the  
Association in the early years was much more of a  
regulatory Association than an active programming  
15 organization. But as we moved in the last two decades, we  
have moved into a much stronger programmatic role. Most  
of us are hired to administer programs and put them into  
place.

20 They involve some degree of working within  
the rules and so on. But in terms of the pursuit, as you  
have suggested, on the regulatory side, I think that is  
perhaps the function that we should address in a much more  
serious way, and address in terms of even perhaps staffing  
or address it in terms of volunteer members ready to  
25 behave in this function much more strongly than it has



been.

It is very difficult as someone who is running an organization with a variety of issues at any given moment in time. I can recall one day someone said  
5 to me "Well, good god, you have just answered 10 different people on 10 different subject and that's been within the last five to ten minutes, you are being stressed quite heavily."

Pursuing this is an important one, I think.  
10 It is a full time job, and it needs to be pursued somewhat stronger, I believe.

I absolutely support the concept of random out-of-competition testing in the most sophisticated way possible. I appreciate the difficulties. I appreciate  
15 some degree the inconvenience as an athlete being required to submit a urine sample in a fashion that is at least somewhat public, semipublic. But I believe it is essential for the betterment of sport. We are not going to get around it, and I support that one entirely.

I think the suspension issue is something  
20 that should perhaps be kept in mind. I suggested a three-year period after considerable deliberation. It was based upon the view that young men and women, peer pressure, that kind of situation make stupid mistakes. I  
25 am not sure a lifetime ban is appropriate for that kind of



stupid mistake under those kinds of conditions and therefore I felt that three years while taking considerable bite out of their athletic career, I believe there still would be time to come back, especially given  
5 that an athlete can be still reaching his prime as he gets to 29 and 30 years of age.

On the other hand, three years for an older athlete is like a lifetime ban. And I don't have much sympathy for that individual. They should know better  
10 after those years and been much stronger individuals.

So, I think the idea of a stronger suspension period is an important one. The IAAF moved somewhat by going to a two-year period, but that still -- one can see the end of that tunnel very quickly and it may  
15 not serve as strong a deterrent as possible.

Selection criteria. I think you have already heard a lot about in terms of carding and team selection, Olympic team selection, all of these factors that lead individuals to consider how strong what they may  
20 do. I think we have to look at that very carefully. I think it is going to be difficult, perhaps, to get the kind of research needed, but I think that's a very positive step that should be pursued.

A couple of other points that I would like  
25 to stress is, one, if I understand correctly from the



statements that have been made as part of the banned substance issue or the decision an individual makes is that it takes a long time to develop. And this is a kind of shortcut, if I understand correctly.

5                   I think the CTFA made a major step in the last three or four years as it began to play with the concept of an espoire team. And it's fundamentally this espoire team concept is the team that sits between being a junior team and a senior elite team and allows kind of the  
10                   concept of a developing athlete that it takes longer -- it takes quite a while for an athlete to develop, and it puts in position a program that will recognize that these people perhaps have the talent to develop to a first rate athlete, but it will take time. And there therefore is a  
15                   necessity to enable that athlete to be supported in whatever fashion.

                  The tragedy during the last two years as we introduced the espoire team concept is that we never had the funding to do it effectively. And perhaps with the  
20                   espoire team programs may also come espoire team carding as another intermediate step between the elite carding and so on.

                  Obviously international pressure is a campaign and even that when I suggested the reinstatement  
25                   policy, one of my motives behind that was that if we could



get our policy expanded to say three years or so it will put us in a good position to support the Minister's international campaign, to campaign with the IAAF to push for a stronger penalty system.

5                   And I believe that that international pressure is critical. I believe that it is a feasible effort. We undertook an issue that noone believed was going to be possible, the replacing or equalizing the junior teenage -- they always had men a year older and the  
10 women a year younger. That was sort of an accepted standard in European competition and noone believed that we would be able to change it.

                  We took a run at it. We hired an internationally renowned individual to do some research  
15 for us at the University of Saskatchewan. We put it together, we sent it out internationally to all the countries, we made sure we sent it in their languages of their choice, things of that nature. And lo and behold we were able to get that passed.

20                   So, we were able to have an impact on something that we didn't think we would win at all, but we did it. I think we also had some impact on racewalking, women's racewalking, which it takes the initiative and the effort and a persistent effort. And I think our Minister  
25 obviously is prepared to pursue that if we as sports



associations can also get on that bandwagon and put ourselves in a position where we can step forward with our policies in the vanguard, move that along. I think that's a positive step.

5                   And I think lastly playing -- I would like to encourage one major kind of initiative which isn't that specific, but Mr. Francis at the beginning said, you know, we may start a meter behind the starting line if we are not involved with banned substances.

10                   I guess I would suggest to you, sir, we start many meters behind the starting line, it has nothing do with banned substances. It has to do with the association having the kind of resources that its leading competitors have. And that's sports science support, sports medicine monitoring support in the fashion that  
15                   will help us, the kind of equipment, the kind of facilities, the kind of good competitions domestically, developing those kinds of things, the kind of media support, the public support, the kind of sport cultural  
20                   support. All of those things we are behind. And that hasn't stopped us as a sport association with taking on and challenging the world. And we will continue to do so, I am quite convinced of that, but I think building a stronger, better system in its totality will make the  
25                   efforts of our athletes to play within the rules much



easier. And I think that's very, very critical to pursue as well.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

5 THE WITNESS: Lastly, one of the key elements the national association, I believe, has to be a strong national association. And I don't know if Mr. Dupre has given you an outline, but there are some weaknesses in how we are structured and our ability to impact and influence down through the system to local  
10 clubs is not as strong as it should be. And I believe we need to do everything we can to strengthen the national associations to have the kind of leadership and fulfill the kind of tasks that have to be fulfilled to get the kind of support behind them.

15 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

MR. FREEDMAN:

20 Q. Mr. Wedmann, do you condone the use of banned performance enhancing drugs in athletic competition?

A. No, I do not.

Q. Did you at any time, in your opinion, while you were President of the Canadian Track and Field Association?

25 A. No, I do not.



MR. FREEDMAN: Those are all my questions.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Mr. Bourque.

--- EXAMINATION BY MR. BOURQUE:

5                   Q.    Yes, Mr. Wedmann, very briefly, I don't  
know how necessary this is, but several months ago an  
athlete witness by the name of Mike Sokolowski gave  
evidence to the effect that the Canadian Track and Field  
Association had let him down in his efforts to become  
10                   recarded in 1985 and 1986. And I put certain statements  
to him in cross-examination. I would like now to, with  
the assistance of two letters from CTFA files,  
substantiate the statements I put to him.

                  I wonder, Mr. Commissioner, if I could just  
15                   provide you with copies of these.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

THE REGISTRAR: 272, Commissioner.

--- EXHIBIT NO. 272: Two letters from the CTFA's files  
20

                  THE COMMISSIONER: Are there two letters  
here, Mr. Bourque?

MR. BOURQUE: Yes, there are, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

25                   THE COMMISSIONER: Well, you can perhaps



outline what the nature of them is and you can tell me what is in here.

MR. BOURQUE: I propose just to draw your attention and the witnesses' attention to the points that are necessary. It is not necessary, I believe, to undertake a full review of the contents at all.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

MR. BOURQUE:

Q. Mr. Wedmann, there are two letters here. The first is dated 26th of November, 1985, and it is addressed to Bill Heikkila at Sport Canada from Gerard Mach. And the second letter is dated February 14th, 1986, and purports to be from you to Ms. Abby Hoffman, the Director General of Sport Canada. Have you reviewed these documents?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. Do you have personal knowledge of the issues and information contained in them?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. Now, in the first one I just point out to you the first sentence of the document which reads:

"During our carding meetings, the CTFA has raised a serious concern that the carding criteria negotiated for the upcoming carding



cycle have left several deserving athletes uncarded."

I would suggest to you from that that it is apparent that Mr. Mach is here attempting to have Sport Canada reconsider certain athletes for carding; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. And then on page 4 of the document we see at the middle of the page under Relay Program the name Sokolowski. And having reviewed the document, would you confirm for me that the appearance of his name there indicates that he was the athlete being put forward by the CTFA for reconsideration?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. Then the next document, this is the letter to Abby Hoffman from you, in the first sentence congratulating Sport Canada on the implementation on their new development card system. You addressed the issue in the third paragraph of again asking Sport Canada to reconsider carding of a number of track athletes. And there are several athletes named there, but then there appears the men's 4 X 400 relay team. And I ask you, sir, obviously it is apparent from the first letter, was Mr. Sokolowski one of the members of that relay team?

A. Yes, he was.



Q. Is the force and effect of these letters that the CTFA was, in fact, endeavouring to have Mr. Sokolowski carded for the '85 - '86 carding year?

A. Yes, he was.

5 MR. BOURQUE: I have no further questions.  
Thank you, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Mr. Pratt?

MR. PRATT: No, thank you, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Any other questions?

10 Mr. DePencier?

MR. DEPENCIER: No, thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Armstrong, any re-examination.

15 --- RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. ARMSTRONG:

Q. There was just one question that I had intended to ask and I just spoke to Mr. Freedman, about it, if I may.

20 Could you just tell us briefly, Mr. Wedmann, why you left the CTFA and resigned, I believe, in April 1988, although stayed on a period of time on a part-time basis until June of 1988?

A. Yes, sir. I had been asked, I think somewhere in October or November of the previous year  
25 whether I would be interested in serving in the Canadian



Sport and Fitness Administration Centre. At that time it was called the National Sport and Recreation Center.

And the fact that the incumbent president was going to be retiring or resigning shortly and that  
5 would I consider that position.

I had been involved with the National Sport and Recreation Center in its corporate review on the mandate committee. And so I was aware of a lot of the exciting things we were talking about, seeing how that  
10 corporation is rejuvenated, reshaped for the future.

As a consequence, I agreed to take on that position. And it was then a matter of timing simply of when I would leave.

As we got in to -- as I finished my  
15 evaluation report for the CTFA and began working on the plan for quadrennial planning for '92, I began to realize that I really wanted to do the planning for the '92 quadrennial. It was a very exciting and tempting thing, but in the process I also realized I was being selfish  
20 because another individual, my successor, was going to have to come in and have to implement a plan that I was very much at the heart of developing.

And I realized how much advantage I got as a result of being on the mandate Committee of the National  
25 Sport and Recreation Centre, and it made absolute sense to



say, look, you better get out of here and let your  
successor get on with leading the planning process. It  
would be a very good way of that person taking on the  
leadership role, developing the power base needed to run  
5 the CTFA.

And, so, therefore I made a decision to get  
out earlier rather than later in 1988.

Q. All right. Did your decision to leave  
in the spring of 1988 have anything whatever to do with  
10 the issue of doping or drugs --

A. Not in the least.

Q. -- among Canadian athletes?

A. Not in the least. I was going to a  
position that was going to be substantially more rewarding  
15 financially as well, and the opportunity to work on a  
broader basis for sport as a whole as opposed to just  
working in one area.

CTFA, of course, was my love having been a  
member of it, and continue to be a part of that system.  
20 But this opportunity doesn't come across very often. The  
encumbent had been there for 10 years, the next  
opportunity was who knows how long.

So, it was an opportune time to move on.  
And in some ways it was to do what I had been hired to do  
25 for the CTFA, to be part of a change agent in the



corporation of helping it change its way of operations.  
So, this was the natural opportunity.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. All right

5 Well, thank you very much, Mr. Wedmann.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Armstrong.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Yes, we anticipated  
yesterday afternoon that if we had gotten to Mr. Ouellette  
10 at this time, as we expected we would, that there was a  
risk of his carrying over until our next session, which  
would not be until the week of the 11th of September.  
Also both Mr. Ouellette --

THE COMMISSIONER: The next session is the  
15 5th of September; he won't be available then.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Yes, the next session is  
the 5th of September, I am sorry, and he is not available  
that week, nor are other representatives of the Canadian  
Track and Field Association.

20 So, also both he and his counsel, Mr.  
Fournier, did have travelling arrangements that suggested  
they were going to be able to leave last night and they  
had both scheduled plans --

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

25 MR. ARMSTRONG: -- in Quebec today.



THE COMMISSIONER: So, they will be  
rescheduled, I understand.

MR. ARMSTRONG: So, yes, we are planning at  
the moment --

5 THE COMMISSIONER: So, will Mr. Dupre.

MR. ARMSTRONG: -- to proceed with Mr.  
Ouellette and Mr. Dupre probably on Wednesday of the week  
of the 11th, which will be the 13th.

10 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Well, then  
we will adjourn the hearings until Tuesday, September 5th.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you.

15 --- Whereupon the hearings adjourned until Tuesday,  
September 5, 1989, at 10:00 a.m.

20

25





